Tolstoy\u27s dream and the quest for statistical equilibrium in economics and the social sciences by Garibaldi, Ubaldo & Scalas, Enrico
Metadata of the chapter that
will be visualized online
Series Title
Chapter Title Tolstoy’s dream and the quest for statistical equilibrium in economics and the social sciences
Chapter SubTitle
Copyright Year 2010
Copyright Holder Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Family Name Garibaldi
Particle
Given Name Ubaldo
Corresponding Author
Suffix
Division IMEM-CNR and Università di Genova
Organization Dipartimento di Fisica
Address via Dodecaneso 33, 16146, Genova, Italy
Email garibaldi@fisica.unige.it
Family Name Scalas
Particle
Given Name Enrico
Author
Suffix
Division Dipartimento di Scienze e Tecnologie Avanzate
Organization Università del Piemonte Orientale
Address viale T. Michel 11, 15121, Alessandria, Italy
Email enrico.scalas@mfn.unipmn.it
Tolstoy’s dream The agent-based approach to Economics and the Social Sciences is becoming AQ1 more and more popular
among scholars interested in going beyond mainstream analyses [14]. This approach is trying to reconcile
methodological individual- ism [13] with the existence of emergent phenomena in social systems [2].
BookID 188554 ChapID 005 Proof# 1 - 06/05/10
U
nc
or
re
ct
ed
Pr
oo
f
1
Tolstoy’s dream and the quest for statistical 2
equilibrium in economics and the social 3
sciences 4
Ubaldo Garibaldi1 and Enrico Scalas2 5
1 IMEM-CNR and Universita` di Genova, Dipartimento di Fisica, via Dodecaneso 6
33, 16146 Genova, Italy, garibaldi@fisica.unige.it 7
2 Universita` del Piemonte Orientale, Dipartimento di Scienze e Tecnologie 8
Avanzate, viale T. Michel 11, 15121 Alessandria, Italy, 9
enrico.scalas@mfn.unipmn.it 10
1 Tolstoy’s dream 11
The agent-based approach to Economics and the Social Sciences is becoming
AQ1
12
more and more popular among scholars interested in going beyond mainstream 13
analyses [14]. This approach is trying to reconcile methodological individual- 14
ism [13] with the existence of emergent phenomena in social systems [2]. 15
Some of these concepts may appear brand new, but, at least, they can be 16
traced back to the philosophical and scientific discussions taking place in the 17
XIXth Century. The basic idea is that there is an analogy between human 18
societies where many individuals interact and gases where many atoms or 19
molecules interact. Indeed, as discussed by Hacking in The Taming of Chance 20
[8], Boltzmann himself used this analogy in order to justify the atomic hy- 21
pothesis. This idea was pervasive in XIXth Century thinkers. We like to think 22
of Tolstoy’s novel War and Peace [15] as an early agent-based simulation. The 23
author explores the behaviour and interactions of his 580 characters during 24
the Napoleonic invasion of Russia. More specifically, the second epilogue of the 25
novel reveals Tolstoy’s theoretical interests and his model of human history. 26
Let Tolstoy directly speak: 27
Speaking of the interaction of heat and electricity and of atoms, we 28
cannot say why this occurs, and we say that it is so because it is 29
inconceivable otherwise, because it must be so and that it is a law. 30
The same applies to historical events. Why war and revolution occur 31
we do not know. We only know that to produce the one or the other 32
action, people combine in a certain formation in which they all take 33
part, and we say that this is so because it is unthinkable otherwise, or 34
in other words that it is a law. 35
G. Naldi et al. (eds.), Mathematical Modeling of Collective Behavior
in Socio-Economic and Life Sciences, DOI 10.1007/978-0-8176-4946-3 5,
c© Birkha¨user Boston, a part of Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010
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Therefore, in the XIXth Century, the analogy on which current agent-based 36
simulations are grounded was so popolar that it found its way through liter- 37
ature. Unfortunately for Economics, the mechanical analogy was used in its 38
static version and the concept of statistical equilibrium remained unknown to 39
most economists troughout all the XXth Century and up to now. 40
2 Statistical equilibrium in economics 41
2.1 What is the common notion of equilibrium in economics? 42
The concept of equilibrium referred to in General Equilibrium Theory is taken 43
from Physics. It coincides with mechanical equilibrium. 44
When looking for mechanical equilibrium one minimizes a potential func- 45
tion subject to boundary conditions, in order to find equilibrium positions; 46
when looking for standard (micro)economic equilibrium, one maximizes a util- 47
ity function subject to budget constraints (this is the consumer side, in other 48
words, demand) and maximizes the profit subject to cost constraints (this 49
is producer side, in other words, supply); then one equates supply and de- 50
mand, and finds equilibrium quantities and prices. In both cases, the math- 51
ematical tool is optimization with constraints using the method of Lagrange 52
multipliers. 53
Walras and Pareto explicitly inspired their pioneering work on General 54
Equilibrium Theory to Physics and mechanical equilibrium. This was made 55
clear by Ingrao and Israel [9]. 56
2.2 What is statistical equilibrium? 57
Statistical equilibrium is another notion of equilibrium in Physics. It was de- 58
fined by Maxwell and Boltzmann in their early work on the theory of gases, 59
trying to reconcile mechanics and thermodynamics. In order to better un- 60
derstand this notion, it is useful to make use of a Markovianist approach to 61
statistical equilibrium as discussed by Oliver Penrose (the brother of Roger 62
Penrose) in his 1970 book [10]. By the way, a similar approach was pro- 63
moted by Richard von Mises (the brother of Ludwig von Mises) in a book 64
reprinted in 1945 (actually the book was written by R. von Mises before World 65
War II) [16]. 66
A finite Markov chain is a stochastic process defined as a sequence of 67
random variables X1, . . . , Xn on the same probability space that assume values 68
in a finite set S, known as the state space. For a Markov chain, the predictive 69
probability P(Xn = xn|Xn−1 = xn−1, . . . , X1 = x1) has the following simple 70
form: 71
P(Xn = xn|Xn−1 = xn−1, . . . , X1 = x1) = P(Xn = xn|Xn−1 = xn−1). (1)
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In other words, the predictive probability does not depend on all the past 72
states, but on the last state occupied by the chain. As a consequence of 73
the multiplication theorem, one gets that the finite-dimensional distribution 74
P(X1 = x1, . . . , Xn = xn) is given by: 75
P(X0 = x0, . . . , Xn = xn)
= P(Xn = xn|Xn−1 = xn−1) · · ·P(X1 = x1|X0 = x0)P(X0 = x0). (2)
As a consequence of Kolmogorov’s representation theorem, this means that a 76
Markov chain is fully characterized by the knowledge of the functions P(Xm = 77
xm|Xm−1 = xm−1), also known as transition probabilities and P(X0 = x0), 78
also known as initial probability distributions. If the transition probabilities do 79
not depend on the index m but only on the initial and on the final state, then 80
the Markov chain is called homogeneous. In the following, only homogeneous 81
Markov chains will be considered. For the sake of simplicity, it is useful to 82
introduce the notation 83
P (x, y) = P(Xm = y|Xm−1 = x) (3)
for the transition probability and 84
p(x) = P(X0 = x) (4)
for the initial probability distribution. Note that P (x, y) is nothing else than 85
a matrix in the finite case under scrutiny, with the property that 86
∑
y∈S
P (x, y) = 1; (5)
in other words the rows of the matrix sum up to 1 as a consequence of the 87
addition axiom. Such matrices are called stochastic matrices (to be distin- 88
guished from random matrices which are matrices with random entries). Note 89
that the initial distribution can be written as a row vector, so that one can 90
obtain the marginal distribution of the random variable Xn as: 91
P(Xn = y) =
∑
x∈S
p(x)P (n)(x, y), (6)
where P (n)(x, y) represents the (x, y) entry of the n-step transition matrix. 92
Now, assume there is a distribution π(x) satisfying the equation: 93
π(y) =
∑
x∈S
π(x)P (x, y), (7)
then π(x) is called a stationary distribution or invariant measure. If at time 94
step t the chain is described by P(Xt = x) = π(x), then from (7), it follows 95
that P(Xt+1 = x) = π(x) = P(Xt = x); in other words, the distribution does 96
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not change as time goes by. Note that the states are jumping from one to 97
another one, but the probability of finding the system in a specific state does 98
not change. This is exactly the idea of statistical equilibrium put forward by 99
Ludwig Boltzmann. 100
However, more can and should be said. First of all, the stationary distri- 101
bution may not exist; secondly, the chain usually starts from a specific state, 102
so that the initial distribution is a vector full of 0’s and with a single 1 in the 103
initial state. The latter state of affairs can be represented by a Kronecker delta 104
π(x) = δ(x, x0), where x0 is the specific initial state. This is not a stationary 105
distribution and the convergence of the chain to the stationary distribution 106
is not granted at all. Fortunately, it turns out that under some rather mild 107
conditions: 108
• The stationary distribution exists and it is unique; 109
• The chain always converges to the stationary distribution irrespective of 110
its initial distribution. 111
It is indeed sufficient to consider a finite chain that is irreducible and aperi- 112
odic. A chain is irreducible if all the states are persistent; this is equivalent to 113
claim that any state can be reached from any other state with finite probabil- 114
ity in a finite number of steps. The chain is aperiodic if for any x, one has that 115
P (s)(x, x) > 0 for s > s0(x); in other words, after a possible transitory period, 116
the probability of return is positive. All these conditions essentially mean that 117
the s-step matrix P(s) no more has any zero entries after a sufficient number 118
of steps. 119
If the finite Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic, then it has a unique 120
invariant distribution π(x) and 121
lim
n→∞P
(n)(x, y) = π(y) (8)
irrespective of the initial state x. This means that, after a transient period, 122
the distribution of chain states reaches a stationary distribution, which can 123
then be interpreted as an equilibrium distribution in the statistical sense. 124
2.3 Why and where statistical equilibrium may be useful 125
in economics? 126
There are several possible domains of application of the concept of statistical 127
equilibrium in Economics. Incidentally, note that many agent-based models 128
used in Economic theory are intrinsically Markov chains (or Markovian pro- 129
cesses). Therefore, the ideas discussed earlier naturally apply. Up to now, we 130
have used these concepts: 131
• To discuss some toy models for the distribution of wealth (not of income!) 132
as in Scalas et al. (2006) [11] and in Garibaldi et al. (2007) [6]. 133
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• To generalize a sectoral productivity model originally due to Aoki and 134
Yoshikawa [1], in Scalas and Garibaldi (2009) [12]. 135
In [6, 11, 12], we promote the use of a finitary approach to combinatorial 136
stochastic processes. This approach is the subject of a forthcoming book [7] 137
and will be illustrated by an example in the next section. 138
3 An example: the taxation-redistribution game 139
3.1 Basic descriptions 140
Consider a system of n coins to be divided into g agents. There are three levels 141
of description for the system. 142
• (individual descriptions) Let the integers from 1 to n denote the coins and 143
the integers from 1 to g denote the agents. Let us introduce the variables 144
V1, . . . , Vn whose values are given by the integers between 1 and g; by 145
Vi = j, we mean the the ith coin belongs to the jth agent. 146
• (frequency or occupation descriptions) If the names (or labels) of the coins 147
are irrelevant, it is possible to use the variables Y1, . . . , Yg where Yi = ni 148
is the number of coins in the pocket of the ith agent. In symbols, one can 149
write Yi = #{Vj = i, j = 1, . . . , n}. If the vect r Y = n = (n1, . . . , ng) 150
denotes a particular frequency description, one has
∑g
i=1 ni = n. 151
• (frequency of frequencies or partitions) For k = 1, . . . , n, the variables 152
defined by Zk = #{Yi = k, i = 1, . . . , g} give the number of agents with k 153
coins. If the vector Z = z = (z0, . . . , zn) denotes a particular partition, it 154
must satisfy the two constraints
∑n
k=0 zk = g and
∑n
k=1 kzk = n. 155
Example (n = 3 objects (coins) into g = 2 categories) 156
• There are eight individual descriptions: (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 2), (1, 2, 1), (2, 1, 1), 157
(2, 2, 1), (2, 1, 2), (1, 2, 2), (2, 2, 2). 158
• There are four occupation vectors: (3, 0) corresponding to (1, 1, 1); (2, 1) 159
corresponding to (1, 1, 2), (1, 2, 1) and (2, 1, 1); (1, 2) corresponding to 160
(2, 2, 1), (2, 1, 2) and (1, 2, 2); (0, 3) corresponding to (2, 2, 2). 161
• There are two partition vectors: (1, 0, 0, 1) corresponding to (3, 0) and 162
(0, 3); (0, 1, 1, 0) corresponding to (1, 2) and (2, 1). 163
The three basic descriptions define possible constituents of the sample 164
space for the individual descriptions. Note that: 165
• For each occupation vector n = (n1, . . . , ng) there are 166
n!∏g
i=1 ni!
(9)
corresponding individual descriptions; 167
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• For each partition vector z = (z0, . . . , zn) there are 168
g!∏n
i=0 zi!
(10)
corresponding occupation vectors; 169
• The total number of individual descriptions is gn; 170
• The total number of occupation vectors is (g + n− 1)!/[n!(g − 1)!]; 171
• For the total number of partition vectors, a closed formula is not available. 172
3.2 Taxation (destruction) and redistribution (creation) 173
In this section, a stylized probabilistic model for taxation and redistribu- 174
tion will be introduced, based on [6]. A taxation is a step in which a coin 175
is randomly taken out of n coins and a redistribution is a step in which 176
the coin is given back to one of the g agents. A taxation move is equiva- 177
lent to a destruction/annihilation and a redistribution move to a creation 178
[3–5]. This model is conservative as the numbers of agents g and of coins n 179
do not change in time. Moreover, it only includes so-called unary moves. If 180
the initial state is given by n = (n1, . . . , ni, . . . , nj , . . . , ng), the final state 181
is nji = (n1, . . . , ni − 1, . . . , nj + 1, . . . , ng), after taxation and redistribution. 182
Note that indebtedness is not possible. If a coin is randomly selected out of n 183
coins, the probability of selecting a coin belonging to agent i is ni/n. There- 184
fore, in this model, agents are taxed proportionally to their wealth measured 185
in terms of the number of coins in their pockets. The redistribution step is 186
crucial as it can favour agents with many coins (a rich gets richer mechanism) 187
or agents with few coins (a taxation scheme leading to equality). This can be 188
done by assuming that the probability of giving the coin taken from agent 189
i to agent j is proportional to wj + nj , where nj is the number of coins in 190
the pocket of agent j and wj is a suitable weight. Depending on the choice 191
of wj , one can obtain different equilibrium situations. Based on the previous 192
considerations, it is assumed that the transition probability is: 193
P(nji |n) =
ni
n
wj + nj − δi,j
w + n− 1 , (11)
where w =
∑g
i=1 wi and the Kronecker symbol δi,j takes into account the case 194
i = j. If the condition wj = 0 is satisfied, then also agents without coins can 195
receive them. If all the agents are equivalent, one has wj = a, uniformly and 196
w = ga = θ, so that (11) becomes 197
P(nji |n) =
ni
n
a + nj − δi,j
θ + n− 1 . (12)
3.3 Statistical equilibrium 198
From (7), one can see that the invariant distribution is the left eigenvector 199
corresponding to eigenvalue 1 for the matrix of transition probabilities. How- 200
ever, the direct diagonalization of (11) is cumbersome. In this case, it is easier 201
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to use detailed balance. If a probability p(n) can be found satisfying detailed 202
balance, then this is an invariant distribution! In our case, if i = j, the direct 203
flux is given by: 204
p(n)P(nji |n) = p(n)
ni
n
a + nj
θ + n− 1 (13)
whereas the inverse flux is given by: 205
p(nji )P(n|nji ) = p(nji )
nj + 1
n
a + ni − 1
θ + n− 1 . (14)
Equating the two fluxes, we get 206
p(n)
p(nji )
=
nj + 1
ni
a + ni − 1
a + nj
. (15)
The g-variate Po´lya distribution discussed in the Appendix satisfies (15), so 207
that, eventually, we get the invariant distribution for the taxation-redistri- 208
bution model (it is the case α1 = α2 = · · · = αg = a) 209
p(n) =
n!
θ[n]
g∏
i=1
a[ni]
ni!
. (16)
Moreover, a little thought should convince the reader that the Markov chain 210
defined by (12) is irreducible and aperiodic. Therefore, the invariant distribu- 211
tion (16) is unique and it is also the equilibrium distribution. Three important 212
particular cases of (16) are: 213
• For a = 1 214
p(n) =
(
n + g − 1
n
)−1
; (17)
this is the uniform distribution on all occupation vectors n; 215
• For |a| → ∞ 216
p(n) =
n!∏g
i=1 ni!
1
gn
; (18)
this coincides with the multinomial distribution and corresponds to the 217
uniform distribution on the individual descriptions; 218
• For a = −1 219
p(n) =
(
g
n
)−1
; (19)
this is again the uniform distribution on the restricted support of all 220
occupation vectors n with ni = 0, 1. 221
The case a = 1 coincides with the so-called Bose-Einstein distribution, the 222
case |a| → ∞ with the so-called Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution, and the case 223
a = −1 leads to the so-called Fermi-Dirac distribution. As discussed in the 224
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Appendix, these three remarkable cases correspond to three urn models. The 225
Bose-Einstein distribution is related to the Po´lya urn, the Maxwell-Boltzmann 226
distribution to the Bernoullian urn and the Fermi-Dirac distribution to the 227
hypergeometric urn. However, in this model, the parameter a needs not be 228
confined to the three values discussed earlier and it can assume any real posi- 229
tive value and any negative integer value. Moreover, in our stylized model, the 230
redistribution policy is characterized by the value of the parameter a. If a is 231
small and positive, on has that rich agents become richer, but for a →∞ the 232
redistribution policy becomes random: any agent has the same probability of 233
receiving the coin. Eventually, the case a < 0 favours poor agents, but |a| is 234
the maximum allowed wealth for each agent. 235
3.4 Wealth (coin) distribution 236
As discussed in the Appendix, agents’ exchangeability lead to a simple re- 237
lationship between the joint probability distribution of partitions and the 238
probability of a given occupation vector. One has that 239
P(Z = z) =
g!∏n
i=0 zi!
P(Y = n) =
g!∏n
i=0 zi!
n!∏g
j=1 ni!
g∏
j=1
a[ni]
θ[n]
=
g!n!∏n
i=0 zi!(i!)zi
g∏
j=1
a[ni]
θ[n]
, (20)
where, as discussed in Sect. 3.1, zi is the number of agents with i coins. Now, 240
both (16) and (20) are multivariate distributions. In order to get a univariate 241
distribution, to be compared with empirical data, we consider the marginal 242
distribution that describes a single agent. Given that all the agents are char- 243
acterized by the same weight a, we can focus on the behaviour of the random 244
variable Y = Y1 representing the number of coins of agent 1. Starting from 245
Yt = k, one can define the following transition probabilities 246
w(k, k + 1) = P(Yt+1 = k + 1|Yt = k) = n− k
n
a + k
θ + n− 1 , (21)
meaning that a coin is randomly selected among the other n−k coins belonging 247
to the other g − 1 agents and given to agent 1 according to the weight a and 248
to the number of coins k, 249
w(k, k − 1) = P(Yt+1 = k − 1|Yt = k) = k
n
θ − a + n− k
θ + n− 1 , (22)
meaning that a coin is randomly removed from agent 1 and redistributed to 250
one of the other agents according to the weight θ− a and the number of coins 251
n− k, and 252
w(k, k) = P(Yt+1 = k|Yt = k) = 1− w(k, k + 1)− w(k, k − 1), (23)
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meaning that agent 1 is not affected by the move taking place at step t + 1. 253
These equations define a birth–death Markov chain corresponding to a random 254
walk with semi-reflecting barriers. This chain represents the wealth dynamics 255
of a single agent interacting with a thermal bath consisting of the other g − 256
1 agents. Indeed, the invariant (and equilibrium) distribution of the birth- 257
death chain can be directly obtained marginalizing (16). This leads to the 258
dichotomous Po´lya distribution (see the Appendix): 259
P(Y = k) = pk =
n!
k!(n− k)!
a[k](θ − a)[n−k]
θ[n]
. (24)
Equation (24) can be compared with the behaviour of the agent as time goes 260
by. As a consequence of the ergodic theorem for irreducible chains, it follows 261
that 262
lim
t→∞
#{Ys = k, s = 0, . . . , t}
t
= pk, (25)
where pk is given by (24). In other words, the marginal equilibrium proba- 263
bility is also the large-time limit of the hitting time relative frequency. These 264
consideration are important, in order to identify the probabilistic objects to 265
be compared to empirical (or to simulated) data. 266
The same procedure can be used for the wealth distribution z. The random 267
variable Zk counts the number of agents with k coins. Denoting by I
(k)
Yj
= 268
IYj=k the indicator function of the event {Yj = k}, the random variable Zk 269
can also be written as follows 270
Zk = I
(k)
Y1
+ I(k)Y2 + . . . + I
(k)
Yg
; (26)
Therefore, we find that 271
E(Zk) =
g∑
j=1
E(I(k)Yj ) =
g∑
j=1
P(Yj = k), (27)
where P(Yj = k) is the marginal distributions for the jth agent. As a con- 272
sequence of the equivalence of all agents, from (24) and (27), one gets that 273
274
E(Zk) = gP(Y = k) = g
n!
k!(n− k)!
a[k](θ − a)[n−k]
θ[n]
. (28)
Equation (28) gives the first moment of the probability function on all possible 275
wealth distributions (20) for the taxation-redistribution model. 276
The thermodynamic limit for (24) when n  1, g  1 and n/g = aχ leads 277
to the negative binomial distribution as an approximation of the dichotomous 278
Po`lya distribution (see the Appendix) 279
P
TL(Y = k) = NegBin(k|a, χ) = a
[k]
k!
(
1
1 + χ
)a (
χ
1 + χ
)k
. (29)
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On the other side, the continuous limit for the wealth distribution is (see the 280
Appendix) 281
fB(x) =
Γ (θ)
Γ (a)Γ (θ − a)x
a−1(1− x)θ−a−1, (30)
where x = k/n is the continous variable corresponding to the normalized 282
wealth of the first agent (0 ≤ x ≤ 1) and fB(x) is its Beta probability density 283
function. The thermodynamic limit of (30) leads to the Gamma(x|a, u) density 284
pTL(x) =
u−a
Γ (a)
xa−1 exp
(
−x
u
)
. (31)
where u = w/a, and the meaning of w is the expected value of the wealth 285
of the selected agent, which stays constant when the continuous thermostat 286
becomes infinite. (See the Appendix). 287
3.5 Block taxation and the convergence to equilibrium 288
Consider the case in which taxation is made in the following way: instead 289
of drawing a single coin from an agent at each step, m ≤ n coins are ran- 290
domly taken from various agents and then redistributed with the mechanism 291
described earlier, that is with a probability proportional t the actual number 292
of coins and to an a priori weight. If n = (n1, . . . , ng) is the initial occupation 293
vector, m = (m1, . . . ,mg) (with
∑g
i=1 mi = m) is the taxation vector, and 294
m′ = (m′1, . . . ,m
′
g) (with
∑g
i=1 m
′
i = m) is the redistribution vector, we can 295
also write 296
n′ = n−m+m′. (32)
The block taxation-redistribution model still has (16) as its equilibrium dis- 297
tribution, as the block step is equivalent to m steps of the original taxation- 298
redistribution model. However, the convergence rate to equilibrium is faster. 299
The marginal analysis for the block taxation-redistribution model in terms 300
of a birth–death Markov chain is more cumbersome than for the original model 301
because, now, the difference |ΔY | can vary from 0 to m. In any case, given 302
that (24) always gives the equilibrium distribution, this means that (see the 303
Appendix) 304
E(Y ) = n
a
θ
=
n
g
, (33)
and 305
Var(Y ) = n
a
θ
θ − a
θ
θ + n
θ + 1
=
n
g
g − 1
g
θ + n
θ + 1
. (34)
We can write 306
Yt+1 = Yt −Dt+1 + Ct+1, (35)
where Dt+1 is the random taxation for the given agent and Ct+1 is the ran- 307
dom redistribution to the given agent. The expected value of Dt+1 under the 308
condition Yt = k is 309
E(Dt+1|Yt = k) = mk
n
; (36)
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this result is valid as m coins are taken at random out of the n coins and 310
the probability of removing a coin from the first agent is k/n under the given 311
condition. Moreover, if Yt = k and Dt+1 = d, we get that the probability of 312
giving a coin back to agent 1 is (a+k−d)/(θ+n−m), so that, after averaging 313
over Dt+1|Yt = k, we have 314
E(Ct+1|Yt = k) = m
a + k −mk
n
θ + n−m . (37)
The expected value of Yt+1−Yt conditioned on Yt = k can be found from the 315
expectation of (35) and using (36) and (37). This yields: 316
E(Yt+1 − Yt|Yt = k) = − mθ
n(θ + n−m)
(
k − na
θ
)
. (38)
The following remarks on (38) are possible: 317
1. Equation (38) is analogous to a mean reverting equation. If, due to random 318
fluctuations, E(Yt+1|Yt = k) moves away from its equilibrium expected 319
value na/θ = n/g, it will then move back towards that value; 320
2. If k = na/θ then the chain is first-order stationary. If one begins with 321
n/g, then one always gets E(Yt+1 − Yt|Yt = k) = 0; 322
3. r = mθ/(n(θ + n−m)) is the intensity of the restoring force. The inverse 323
of r, gives the order of magnitude for the number of transitions needed to 324
reach equilibrium. 325
4. If m = n, meaning that all the coins are taken and then redistributed, the 326
new state has no memory of the previous one and statistical equilibrium 327
is reached in a single step (r−1 = 1)! 328
Before concluding this section, it is interesting to discuss the case θ < 0 in 329
detail. In this case the marginal equilibrium distribution becomes the hyper- 330
geometric one: 331
P(Y = k) =
(|a|
k
)(|θ − a|
n− k
)
(|θ|
n
) , (39)
with a = θ/g and θ negative integers. The range of k is (0, 1, . . . ,min(|a|, n)). 332
The states with ni > |a| are transient and they do not appear any more as 333
times goes by. 334
If, for instance, |a| = 10n/g (ten times the average wealth), one has that 335
|θ| = 10n and r = 10m/(10n − n + m)  (10m)/(9n). If m  n, this is 336
not so far from the independent redistribution case. On the contrary, in the 337
extreme case |a| = n/g, the occupation vector n = (n/g, . . . , n/g) is obtained 338
with probability 1. If an initial state containing individuals richer than |a| 339
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is considered, that is if one considers (38) for k > |a|, then E(Dt+1|Yt = k) 340
is still mk/n but E(Ct+1|Yt = k,Dt+1 = d) = 0 unless k − d < |a|. More 341
precisely, one has 342
E(Ct+1|Yt = k) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
m
|a| − k + mk
n
|θ| − n + m if k −m
k
n
≤ |a|
0 if k −mk
n
> |a|
(40)
If the average percent taxation is f = m/n, then one gets 343
E (Yt+1 − Yt|Yt = k)
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
− fθ
θ − n(1− f)
(
kt − n
g
)
if k(1− f) ≤ |a|
= −k(1− f) if k(1− f) > |a|
(41)
As k(1 − f) is the average value of Y after taxation, even if the agent is 344
initially richer than |a| he/she can participate to redistribution when the mean 345
percentage of taxation is high enough. 346
Appendix: the Po´lya distribution 347
Finite (n-step) stochastic processes 348
The sequence of individual random variables V1, . . . , Vn is an n-step stochas- 349
tic process. It is completely determined by the knowledge of all the finite 350
dimensional distributions of the kind: 351
pV1,...,Vm(v1, . . . , vm) = P(V1 = v1, . . . , Vm = vm), (42)
where 1 ≤ m ≤ n. The finite dimensional distributions are subject to 352
Kolmogorov’s compatibility conditions 353
pV1,...,Vm(v1, . . . , vm) = P(V1 = v1, . . . , Vm = vm)
= P(Vi1 = vi1 , . . . , Vim = vim) = pVi1 ,...,Vim (vi1 , . . . , vim), (43)
where i1, . . . , im is any of the m! permutations of the indices, and 354
pV1,...,Vm−1(v1, . . . , vm−1) =
g∑
vm=1
pV1,...,Vm(v1, . . . , vm−1, vm). (44)
Finite dimensional distributions can be conveniently characterized in terms of 355
predictive probabilities. Indeed, as a consequence of the multiplication theo- 356
rem (and of Bayes’ theorem), one has 357
P(V1 = v1, . . . , Vm = vm) = P(V1 = v1)P(V2 = v2|V1 = v1) · · ·
· · ·P(Vm = vm|V1 = v1, . . . , Vm−1 = vm−1) (45)
and Kolmogorov’s compatibility conditions are automatically satisfied. 358
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Exchangeable processes 359
An exchangeable process is characterized by additional symmetry conditions 360
on the finite dimensional distributions 361
pV1,...,Vm(v1, . . . , vm) = P(V1 = v1, . . . , Vm = vm)
= P(Vi1 = v1, . . . , Vim = vm) = pVi1 ,...,Vim (v1, . . . , vm), (46)
where i1, . . . , im is any of the m! permutations of the indices, Note that con- 362
dition (46) differs from condition (43). For an exchangeable process, the prob- 363
ability of an individual sequence V(m) = v(m) = (V1 = v1, . . . , Vm = vm) only 364
depends on the occupation vector of the sequence m = (m1, . . . ,mg) with 365∑g
i=1 mi = m. This leads to: 366
P(V(m) = v(m)) =
(
m!∏g
i=1 mi!
)−1
P(Y = m) (47)
as a consequence of (9). 367
The Po´lya process 368
The Po´lya process is an exchangeable process characterized by the predictive 369
probability 370
P(Vm+1 = j|V1 = v1, . . . , Vm = vm) = αj + mj
α + m
, (48)
where mj is the number of times in which category j has been observed up 371
to step j, α = (α1, . . . , αg) is a vector of parameters and α =
∑g
i=1 αi. If the 372
new parameters pj = αj/α are introduced, (48) becomes 373
P(Vm = j|V1 = v1, . . . , Vm = vm) = αpj + mj
α + m
. (49)
pj = P(V1 = j) is the a priori probability of category j and (49) is nothing 374
else than a linear mixture between initial or a priori probabilities and the 375
observed frequencies. As a consequence of (48), and of exchangeability (see 376
(47)), one gets the following finite dimensional distributions 377
P(V(m) = v(m)) =
(
m!∏g
i=1 mi!
)−1
Polya(m|m;α), (50)
where the multivariate generalized Po´lya sampling distribution is given by: 378
Polya(m|m;α) = m!
α[m]
g∏
i=1
α
[mi]
i
mi!
, (51)
where x[n] = x(x + 1) · · · (x + n− 1) is the rising factorial. 379
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The Po´lya process encompasses the following remarkable cases: 380
• The multivariate hypergeometric process for integer αj < 0, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , g} 381
with the constraints mj ≤ |αj | and m ≤ α. In this case |αj | represents 382
the initial number of marbles of colour j in an urn from which they are 383
randomly drawn without replacement; this process is not extendible to 384
infinity and ends after n steps; 385
• The multinomial process in the limit |α| → ∞ and |αj | → ∞, with pj = 386
αj/α constant. In this case pj represents the probability of drawing a 387
marble of colour j with replacement from and urn; this process can be 388
exteded to infinity; 389
• The Po´lya urn process for integer αj > 0, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , g}. In this case αj 390
is the initial number of marbles of colour j in an urn. They are randomly 391
drawn and replaced with another ball of the same kind. Also this process 392
is indefinitely extendible. 393
Marginal distributions 394
The marginal distributions for the g-variate generalized Po´lya distribution 395
can be easily derived from the predictive probability given by (48). Consider 396
the probability P(Vm+1 ∈ A|V1 = v1, . . . , Vm = vm), where the set A is a set 397
of categories A = {j1, . . . , jr}. This new predictive probability is given by: 398
P(Vm+1 ∈ A|V(m)) =
r∑
i=1
P(Vm+1 = ji|V(m)), (52)
where, as usual, V(m) = (V1 = v1, . . . , Vm = vm) summarizes the evidence. 399
In the Po´lya case, P(Vm+1 = j|V(m)) is a linear function of both the weights 400
and the occupation numbers; therefore, one gets: 401
P(Vm+1 ∈ A|V(m)) =
∑
j∈A αj +
∑
j∈A mj
α + m
=
αA + mA
α + m
, (53)
where α =
∑
j αj , αA =
∑
j∈A αj and mA =
∑
j∈A mj . As a direct conse- 402
quence of (53), the marginal distributions of the g-variate generalized Po´lya 403
distribution are given by the dichotomous Po´lya distribution of weights αi 404
and α−αi, where i is the category with respect to which the marginalization 405
is performed. In other words, one gets that 406
∑
mj , j =i
Polya(m|m,α) = Polya(mi,m−mi;αi, α− αi)
=
m!
mi!(m−mi)!
α
[mi]
i (α− αi)[m−mi]
α[m]
. (54)
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Moments of the Po´lya distribution 407
Consider the evidence vector V(m) = (V1 = v1, . . . , Vm = vm). In the general 408
case of g categories, it is natural to introduce the indicator function IXi=j(ω) = 409
I
(j)
i , and define S
(j)
m =
∑m
i=1 I
(j)
i . Therefore, the random variable S
(j)
m gives 410
the number of successes for the jth category out of m observations or trials and 411
S
(j)
m = mj . One can determine E(I
(k)
i ) and E(I
(k)
i I
(k)
j ) and derive E(S
(k)
m ) as 412
well as Var(S(k)m ). As for the expected value, one has that E(I
(k)
i ) = 1·P(I(k)i = 413
1) + 0 · P(I(k)i = 0) = P(I(k)i = 1) coinciding with the marginal probability 414
of success, that is the probability of observing category k at the ith step. 415
From (48), in the absence of any evidence, one has P(I(k)i = 1) = P(Xi = 416
k) = αk/α = pk. Therefore, the random variables I
(k)
i are equidistributed and 417
exchangeable, and E(S(k)m ) =
∑m
i=1 E(I
(k)
i ) = mE(I
(k)
1 ), yielding 418
E(S(k)m ) = mpk. (55)
As for the variance Var(S(k)m ), the covariance matrix of I
(k)
1 , . . . , I
(k)
m is needed. 419
Because of the exchangeability of I(k)1 , . . . , I
(k)
m , the moment E[(I
(k)
i )
2] is the 420
same for all i, and E(I(k)i I
(k)
j ) is the same for all i, j, with i = j. Note that 421
(I(k)i )
2 = I(k)i and this means that E[(I
(k)
i )
2] = pk; it follows that 422
Var(I(k)i ) = E[(I
(k)
i )
2]− E2(I(k)i ) = pk(1 − pk) (56)
one can show that 423
E(I(k)i I
(k)
j ) = P(Xi = k,Xj = k); (57)
now, from exchangeability, from (57), and from (48), one gets 424
E(I(k)i I
(k)
j ) = P(Xi = k,Xj = k) = P(X1 = k,X2 = k)
= E(I(k)1 I
(k)
2 ) = P(X1 = k)P(X2 = k|X1 = k) = pk
αk + 1
α + 1
. (58)
Therefore, the covariance matrix is given by: 425
Cov(I(k)i , I
(k)
j ) = Cov(I
(k)
1 , I
(k)
2 )
= E(I(k)1 I
(k)
2 )− E(I(k)1 )E(I(k)2 ) = pk
α− αk
α(α + 1)
. (59)
The variance of the sum S(k)m follows from (56) and (59) 426
Var(S(k)m ) = mVar(I
(k)
1 )+m(m−1)Cov(I(k)1 , I(k)2 ) = mpk(1−pk)
α + m
α + 1
. (60)
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Thermodynamic limit 427
Let α1 denote the weight of the chosen category and let α − α1 denote the 428
weight of the thermostat. The thermodynamic limit is n, α  1 with χ = n/α. 429
Consider that 430
(α− α1)[n−k]
α[n]
=
(α− α1)(α− α1 + 1) · · ·α(α + 1) · · · (α− α1 + n− k − 1)
α(α + 1) · · · (α + n− 1)
431
=
(α− α1)(α− α1 + 1) · · · (α− 1)
(α − α1 + n− k) · · · (α + n− 1) . (61)
The numerator contains the product
∏α1
i=1(α − i)  αα1 , whereas at the 432
denominator, one has the product
∏α1+k
i=1 (α + n− i)  (α + n)α1+k and the 433
ratio is approximated by: 434
αα1
(α + n)α1+k
; (62)
therefore, we eventually get 435
P(k|n;α1, α)  NegBin(k|α1, χ)
= P(k|α1, χ) = α
[k]
1
k!
(
1
1 + χ
)α1 ( χ
1 + χ
)k
, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ; (63)
this distribution is called negative binomial distribution; the geometric dis- 436
tribution is a particular case of (63) in which α1 = 1 and α = g. If α1 is 437
an integer number, the usual interpretation of the negative binomial random 438
variable is the description of the (discrete) waiting time of (i.e., the number of 439
failures before) the first α1th success in a Bernoullian process with parameter 440
p = 1/(1+χ). The moments of the negative binomial distribution can be ob- 441
tained from the corresponding moments of the Polya(m1,m−m1;α1, α−α1) 442
in the limit n, α  1, with χ = n/α yielding: 443
E(Y1 = k) = n
α1
α
→ α1χ, (64)
Var(Y1 = k) = n
α1
α
α− α1
α
α + n
α + 1
→ α1χ(1 + χ). (65)
Note that if α1 is an integer, k can be interpreted as the sum of α1 independent 444
geometric variables. 445
Continuous limit 446
Consider the multivariate generalized Po´lya distribution given by (51). Noting 447
that 448
α[m] =
Γ (m + α)
Γ (α)
(66)
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(51) can be re-written as: 449
Polya(m|m;α) = Γ (α)∏g
i=1 Γ (αi)
m!
Γ (m + α)
g∏
i=1
Γ (mi + αi)
mi!
. (67)
The variables xi = mi/m satisfy the following constraint 450
g∑
i=1
xi =
g∑
i=1
mi
m
= 1; (68)
moreover, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , g}, we have that 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1. If one considers the 451
continuous limit in which m →∞, mi →∞ with constant xi = mi/m for all 452
the categories i, one finds that 453
Γ (mi + αi)
mi!
=
Γ (mi + αi)
Γ (mi + 1)
 mαi−1i (69)
replacing (69) for any mi and for m in (67) leads to 454
Polya(m|m;α)  Γ (α)∏g
i=1 Γ (αi)
∏g
i=1 m
αi−1
i
mα−1
=
Γ (
∑g
i=1 αi)∏g
i=1 Γ (αi)
g∏
i=1
xαi−1i ·
1
mg−1
. (70)
Equation (70) can be interpreted as follows; based on the exchangeability of 455
the variables Yi = mi, the probability of the variables Xi = Yi/m of assuming 456
values X1 = x1, . . .Xn = xn with xi = mi/m is 457
P(X1 = x1, . . . , Xn = xn)  Γ (
∑g
i=1 αi)∏g
i=1 Γ (αi)
g∏
i=1
xαi−1i ·
1
mg−1
 Γ (
∑g
i=1 αi)∏g
i=1 Γ (αi)
g∏
i=1
xαi−1i dx1 · · · dxg−1, (71)
where the relationship becomes exact in the continuous limit. In fact, the 458
ratio 1/m can be interpreted as Δxi because Δmi = 1 and xi = mi/m. The 459
function 460
p(x1, . . . , xg;α1, . . . αg) = p(x;α) =
Γ (
∑g
i=1 αi)∏g
i=1 Γ (αi)
g∏
i=1
xαi−1i (72)
defined on the simplex
∑g
i=1 xi = 1 and 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 for all the i ∈ {1, . . . g} 461
is the probability density function for the so-called Dirichlet distribution. Let 462
X ∼ Dir(x;α) denote the fact that the random vector X is distributed ac- 463
cording to the Dirichlet distribution. As a consequence of the Po´lya marginal- 464
ization property (53), we obtain the so-called aggregation property of the 465
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Dirichlet distribution: let X1, . . . , Xg be a sequence of random variables with 466
values on the simplex
∑g
i=1 xi with 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . g} whose dis- 467
tribution is Dir(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xi+k, . . . , xg;α1, . . . , αi, . . . , αi+k, . . . , αg), then 468
the new sequence X1, . . . , XA =
∑i+k
j=i Xj , . . . Xg is distributed according to 469
Dir(x1, . . . , xA =
∑i+k
j=i xj , . . . , xg;α1, . . . , αA =
∑i+k
j=i αj , . . . , αg). Thanks to 470
the aggregation property, we can find the marginal distribution of the Dirich- 471
let distribution, whose probability density function is nothing else than the 472
Beta distribution. If X1, . . . , Xg ∼ Dir(x1, . . . , xg;α1, . . . , αg) then 473
Xi ∼ Beta(xi;αi, α− αi). (73)
Starting from the probability density function Beta(x; a, b). 474
p(x) =
Γ (a + b)
Γ (a)Γ (b)
xa−1(1− x)b−1. (74)
and defining y = Ax, then we get 475
f(y) =
Γ (a + b)
Γ (a)Γ (b)
1
A
( y
A
)a−1 (
1− y
A
)b−1
, (75)
with y ∈ [0, A]. While x is the fraction of wealth belonging to the selected 476
agent, now y represents his absolute wealth, being A the total wealth. In the 477
limit A → ∞, b → ∞, A/b = w/a = u constant, the Beta density can be 478
approximated by the Gamma(y|a, u) density given by: 479
g(y) =
u−a
Γ (a)
ya−1 exp
(
− y
u
)
. (76)
The meaning of w is the expected value of the wealth of the selected agent, 480
which stays constant when the continuous thermostat becomes infinite. 481
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